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The Ship of State and the Abandoned Yacht
Mae Kuykendall*
Abstract
The corporation is a fluid entity dominated by the logic of
investment, a logic disjoined from the human stories that exist within
corporations and which are rendered marginal to the subject of
corporate law by the dominant persona of the corporate entity. It is not
clear that this feature of the corporation, which naturally arises from the
logic of financial markets, displaces law so much as, with growth of
capital deployed in the corporation, it makes less accessible to political
understanding more sectors of human experience in which law might
seek a role. The corporation is a site, not of jurisdictio or
gubernaculum, but of fleeting interconnections based on exchange, all
embedded in a whirlwind of words, and defying reification. Hence, the
Ship of State sails on with the cargo it can hold, but the Yacht, where
human desire fed by financial exchange is gathered, sails to an unknown
destination.
The life, corporate maneuverings, and enduringly mysterious death
of the media mogul and corporate takeover titan Robert Maxwell
encapsulate the slipperiness of the corporate domain to cultural narrative
and political understanding. As a corollary, Maxwell's corporate life and
truncated personal story line suggest the slipperiness of the corporate
form as an institutional form that expresses law as power,1 and in which
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I wish to thank
Larry CatA Backer, Adam Candeub, and David A. Westbrook for their helpful interest in
the body of writing of which this essay is one part. I also thank Stephanie T. Goecke for
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1. Larry Catdi Backer, Reifying Law--Government, Law and the Rule of Law in
Governance Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 521, 523 (Winter 2008) ("The
omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything
under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at
every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another.") (quoting MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 93 (Robert Hurley trans.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1978)).
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law is reified as a repository of accessible meanings imposed by the
state. The living Maxwell, and his bodily and corporate remains, provide
a glimpse at the logic of the corporate financial world: its velocity,
malleability, indifference to local context, focus on monetary exchange,
and slipperiness as a human-scale story.
In brief, Maxwell was a media mogul whose life was as pliable and
vaporous as the corporate form. Maxwell acquired names (he was born
Jan Ludwik Hock); a home country (he was born in Carpathia and
became a citizen of the United Kingdom); a total of four hundred
companies by takeover; the appearance of wealth (he was pledging the
same assets to multiple lenders); lavish personal possessions and political
clout;2 a corporate family (into which his son achieved his second,
authentic birth as corporate officer) that enabled him to shift assets from
public corporations to private ones by using deferred payments that never
materialized; and a form of immortality in a death without the tracings of
conventional human departure (he disappeared from his yacht, leaving an
empty stateroom said by the crew to be locked from the inside, and a
body that has refused to surrender up a cause of death).3 Maxwell came
into being, assumed a corporate name, selected a jurisdiction in which to
do business as Robert Maxwell, bought and sold assets by using
persuasive talk,4 and then dissolved. Like a corporation, he was a
fictional entity, given a form and identity using default rules, but
resistant to simple description in a language suited to a story of a life, a
nation, or even an enterprise.
Without doubt, Maxwell occupied space and created effects in a
domain. His death and parts of his life were the stuff of tabloids. Yet his
transaction-centered existence, strictly speaking, was not an expression
of law. His baffling ending as a tabloid headline did not leave tracings of
a comprehensible account of anything at all: a life, power, or the
corporate entity as a set of meanings. The Maxwell "story" at most is a
series of glimpses at the whirlwind of texts in which economic exchange
occurs, but which defy summary, the impact of economic logic joined to
2. As a Holocaust survivor, Maxwell kept a close affiliation with the leaders of
Israel. John A.E. Pottow, The Maxwell Case, in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES 224 (Robert
K. Rasmussen ed., 2007).
3. This account is based on Pottow, supra note 2, at 222-37. In turn, Pottow's
account draws on TOM BOWER, MAXWELL: THE FINAL VERDICT (Harper Collins 1996),
and NICK DAVIES, DEATH OF A TYCOON: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF THE FALL OF ROBERT
MAXWELL (St. Martin's Press 1993).
4. Deirdre McCloskey, How to Buy, Sell, Make, Manage, Produce, Transact,
Consume with Words (June 28, 2007) (on file with author), available at
http://deirdremccloskey.org/docs/words.pdf (examining the extent of the language used
by economic actors to persuade). See also Deirdre N. McCloskey, Creative Destruction
vs. the New Industrial State: The "embedded" capitalism of Joseph Schumpeter and John
Kenneth Galbraith, 39 REASON 59, 64 Oct. 2007, ("Capitalism ... is talk, talk, talk ... ").
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human desire, and the ultimate mystery about the payoff of desire in
stable common meanings. In loose proximity to merger agreements,
standstill agreements, earnouts, lines of credit, indentures, and the like,
are the types of startling personal events that recede into the background
of collective human awareness. The shards of meaning that might be
located in the materials of Maxwell and his enterprises do not fit
together.
The contribution of the global corporation to the store of human
narrative is well represented by the almost empty yacht from which
Maxwell's ambiguous person disappeared, to later be found in the waters
of the Mediterranean Sea. A mysterious disappearance from a lavish
yacht sounds like it could be a good story, fraught as stories of tragedy
on the seas can be,5 but it is hard to say what it is about. Maxwell is a
figure to personify corporate fluidity in a global age. Having assumed a
name suited to his corporate niche, he attained a form of perpetuity in the
curious blank in the story of his end. In the image of his ending, one's
mental picture does not figure the end of a speaking, living Maxwell, but
traces a yacht, abandoned with the relics of desire to a skeleton crew
sealed off from consuming its meanings, and without the charter of
desire authorized by legal title, lacking a destination. We can safely call
the yacht a vessel for human desire, and yet, we have little sense of it as
more than a wandering derelict, filled with returns of global capital but
lacking much in human substance. The yacht did nobody harm, but left
an unsettling image of lost meaning, or meaning that never quite
happened. Does anyone mourn Robert Maxwell?
An apt expression of our last glance at Robert Maxwell can be
found in the elegant expressions of the fluidity of the corporation as
expressed by the well-developed facility of the Delaware Supreme Court
for elegant expressions of the fluidity of the corporation. There is a
gradual recognition and increasingly acute expression of the emptiness of
an idea of a qualitative measure of any given corporation's selection of
investments in the global corporate environment. The court that once
relied on the insights of a director's deposition in stating that, "business
history is not 'compelling"' and "many companies go down the drain
because they try to be 'historic, ' ' '6 now states in its own voice, "[t]he
5. OWEN CHASE, NARRATIVE OF THE MOST EXTRAORDINARY AND DISTRESSING
SHIPWRECK OF THE WHALE-SHIP ESSEX; OF NANTUCKET WHICH WAS ATTACKED AND
FINALLY DESTROYED BY A LARGE SPERMACETI-WHALE, IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN; WITH AN
ACCOUNT OF THE UNPARALLELED SUFFERING OF THE CAPTAIN AND THE CREW (New York,
W.B. Gilley 1821). The sinking of the Titanic and the torpedoing of the Lusitania
provide examples of human interest in endings on the seas with an enduring fascination
as a story.
6. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974).
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Telegraph sale does not strike at International's heart or soul, if that
corporation can be thought to have either one."7  Take away one
newspaper from an assemblage of media properties called Hollinger
International and one still has the vessel, loaded with the returns on
capital, but lacking the human substance of which narrative can be made.
Does anyone mourn The Telegraph?
In business conceived as business, meaning the ongoing process of
arranging economic exchange as well as combining and recombining the
financial claims on the economic value generated by association with
human activity, an event with human effects, of any scale, is defined as a
transaction. For the employees of a paper, selling a paper is a big deal,
but its coming or going from a corporate enterprise is not. For Maxwell,
his disappearance was a huge deal. In global capital, the drama is
outside the transaction. The transaction is something a bunch of lawyers
and bean counters do that has no spectacle value. Hence, Robert
Maxwell incidentally encountered the mortal end of us all, but the nature
of his end, given the corporateness of his persona in our minds,8 matches
the emotional weight of a business transaction. The corporate mogul in a
startling ending, stranded on his yacht, rivals the weightlessness of the
passing of the feckless salesman whose wife groped for words to claim
significance for his life. 9 For Willie Loman and the rest of those who
occupy the City of Gold,10 the payoff of a transaction has to do with how
the fruits of the transaction are spent. You can take money and go watch
King Lear or you can buy a boat, or, if you are rich, you can buy a paper
and dine with the Queen. l" On a global scale, large transactions dwarf
the human details of lives, rendering lives incomprehensible as case
material and dinners with royalty of marginal interest in assessing the
stakes in corporate change.12 The details of lives remain comprehensible
to friends and family, apart from their connection to global business
7. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 384 (Del. Ch. 2004).
8. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, at 1264 n.1 (Del.
1989), (The Delaware Supreme Court helped capture his corporateness in a sentence:
"Unless the context otherwise indicates, the plaintiffs will be referred to collectively as
'Maxwell."').
9. ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN, Act I (quoting Linda, Willie's wife):
I don't say he's a great man. Willie Loman never made a lot of money. His
name was never in the paper. He's not the finest character that ever lived. But
he's a human being, and a terrible thing is happening to him. So attention must
be paid. He's not to be allowed to fall in his grave like an old dog. Attention,
attention must be finally paid to such a person.
Id.
10. See generally DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL
CAPITALISM IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (Routledge 2004).
11. Hollinger Inc., 858 A.2d at 384.
12. See id.
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transactions, unless a life has merged with the corporate abstraction so
thoroughly that one doubts the significance of such a detail as death. As
a public matter, Maxwell's death does not tell or complete a story, but
confirms the quality of corporate abstraction and fluidity. As a personal
matter, as for Willie Loman, comprehensible human significance may be
vindicated in private memory, or not.
If death becomes of dubious significance, drawing attention mainly
for the crashing halt of any hope to make sense of one person's life as a
public human artifact, what prospect might there be to explain the
corporation as a realm of law-giving that, in any manner can be made
manifest through accessible human-level discourse, governs contestable
areas of human concern? If we can make little sense of Maxwell as a
life, or of the corporate events in his many holdings as a comprehensible
narrative, and yet we watched him and his companies come and go and
some of us tried our best to tell a human story, 13 what sense can we make
of the corporation as a site for law fashioned to mediate our common
life? It seems not exactly right to say the corporation has occupied a
space as a law-giver and that law is giving ground to the corporation as
law-giver in a process of attrition or relocation. Instead, it occupies a
space where the velocity of transactions, the abstraction of the
corporation, and the logic of exchange supplant much of the stuff of law
while absorbing personal energies and portions of human lives.14 It does
not require claiming that law mediates stories to say that, in the absence
of narrative understandings and accounts, law recedes. It recedes for
lack of need, having a shrinking domain. The perfection of corporate
logic imports more of the fruitlessness of trying to describe and supervise
economic exchange into entity contexts, which increases the domain in
which words abound but cannot be gathered into a matter for law-giving.
13. In his effort at a summation that makes of Maxwell a "bankruptcy story," Pottow
explains that the protocol created for the international bankruptcy case left in Maxwell's
wake is "fuzzy," since it concerns "a touchy and inchoate area like international
bankruptcy." Pottow tops off the story of a fuzzy regime of law with an effort to create a
connection between an account of international bankruptcy law and Maxwell's life:
As for Maxwell himself, while he lies in peace in Israel (although sometimes
with broken glass thrown at his grave), whatever can be said about his bending
or in some instances outright breaking of the laws, this Holocaust survivor built
up an enormous empire-much of which survives-turned around several
major business ventures on the verge of demise, and remains, without a doubt,
one of the most interesting entrepreneurs (or spies) of the Twentieth Century.
One can only hope that his assassins will be brought to justice soon.
Pottow, supra note 2, at 236.
14. See Int'l Broth. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 975 P.2d 907, 911
(Okla. 1999) (The court, in the course of vindicating certain formal rights of
shareholders, inadvertently encapsulated the unnarratable feature of economic exchange
in large corporations by referring to the "perhaps thousands of stockholders" as
"relatively attenuated people").
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They elude the grasp of law as a construct addressing something that can
be expressed in accessible human terms. This is not to say, though, that
the form of words in the corporation is not human, only that corporate
words are a form of talk that does not speak of local stories.1
5
The arrangements of finance, meaning the trading and re-
arrangement of claims associated exclusively with finance rather than the
contracts for manufacture and transportation, are not like the contracts
Backer describes under which "relations (and behavior) [are]
managed. ''1 6  Indeed, in the course of a talk on the implications of
globalization for the effective regulation of corporate behavior in the
interests of human freedom, Chancellor Strine establishes a vivid
exception to the scope of his talk:
For those of you who came to hear me speak about deal protection
measures, the proper way to go about considering a leveraged buyout
in which management will participate, the backdating of stock
options, the benefits and costs of Sarbanes-Oxley, or Conrad Black,
now would be a good time to exit.
17
In contrast to contracts that regulate industrial activity, the processes of
finance, corporate creations, and recreations of assemblages of claims
relate instead to a set of abstractions that take place in the "language of
economics" 18 and effectuate forms of trade and the movement of capital.
Backer explains that global businesses, through multinational
15. DEIRDRE MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS TowNs: How CAPITALISM BECAME
VIRTUOUS, 1300-1776 (forthcoming 2009), available at http://www.deirdre
mccloskey.com/docs/towns2.doc (latt visited Jan. 6, 2008).
Most controversially, to speak of material actualities, [the draft of Bourgois
Virtues] claims that the rhetorical and ethical change caused modem economic
growth, which at length freed us from poverty. People came to accept the
creative destruction of the old ways of doing things, and the economy paid
them back with interest. The change was the cause, too, of a liberalism which
at length abolished slavery and freed women.
Id. It should be noted that McCloskey is arguing that capitalism is a bourgeois virtue, a
good thing that came about because of a recognition that commerce, and profit, are good.
Hence, the claim about the vacuum in coherence at a local human level in corporate logic
is not a critique aimed at the corporation as legal form. McCloskey's suggestion that a
transformation in the rhetoric of the economy has political effects differs somewhat from
the argument here that the logic of the corporation makes law less relevant but does not
seem at odds with the view that the domain of law may shrink as a certain neutrality in
the logic of exchange is accepted.
16. Catd Backer, supra note 1, at 550.
17. Leo E. Strine, Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications
of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior 1 (Oct. 15, 2007) (on
file with U. Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-26), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract - 1024506 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008.
18. Cati Backer, supra note 1, at 550.
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corporations, create a system based on private law making.1 9 He is
describing the actual operations in the world of the physical entities that
create value that is traded in the arena of corporate finance and the way
in which their operations and customs displace law. Writers, though, as
far apart in time and sensibility as industrialist Henry Ford20 and
progressive corporate law professor Lawrence Mitchell 2 1 have argued
that finance is a separate domain than the activities of the businesses to
which finance is attached.
Hence, the controversy described by Backer for the twenty-first
century, between the power of institutions and the continuing adherence
to the concept of "an autonomous reified complex of law,,22 may well
not be fully engaged in the case of the structures associated with the
culture of corporate transactions and commerce in the control of
enterprises. The reasons are several. First, the corporation at its most
abstract level does not produce material that can be made readily
accessible by narrative to the process of law-making and law-giving. I
argue that the reason for this is the form that discourse concerning
business assumes. The linguistic construct that business fosters does not
produce accessible stories with import for the law-giver.23  The
Foucaultian view of masking power may be irrefutable as a literary
device, but it describes something about the words embedded in
capitalism and in the practice of exchange and not necessarily about a
conscious undertaking to occlude and thereby increase power. The form
of corporate text may tend to communicate little, but one must consider
that the text is a discourse that replicates its form through a logic created
by the task. Courts look for and find locutions to explain their reluctance
to insist that business produce a discourse translatable to the terms in
which they deal as adjudicators. Where they reach a shortfall in the
explanation of a corporate convention, they do not demand a richer
language, or translation.
Even if we ourselves did not perceive a good rationale for these
[golden] parachutes, courts should be loath to condemn a business
practice simply because they do not perceive a good reason for a
given practice. Condemning poorly understood practices simply for
19. Id. at 550-51, 524.
20. See generally HENRY FORD, My LIFE AND WORK (Doubleday 1923).
21. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance
Triumphed Over Industry (2007) (on file with GWU Legal Studies, Research Paper No.
366), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-1017923 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
22. Catd Backer, supra note 1, at 561.
23. But see Larry E. Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, I VA. L. & Bus. REv. 165
(2006) (arguing that negative movies about business cause a mass audience to demand
laws that control and regulate business).
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lack of a clear rationale would substitute the court's business
judgment for the corporation's. 24
Second, the form of corporate discourse and the economic exchange
it engenders do not produce law. As Backer notes, much that supplants
law in some domains is simply custom and practice.25 In the case of the
corporation, the void in narrative that is characteristic of business means
that what is happening in the practice of economic exchange is not
precisely law, and in some respects is best seen as a form of energy-
cunning and manipulation of formal ground rules, rather than custom.
Corporate codes are written to evacuate the common law overhang from
corporate law and to allow corporations to proceed on the basis of deal
making among the participants in a corporation under an anti-reification
26 ~ orationale. In conditions of maximum velocity of capital, corporations
are temporary assemblages of claims and activities, available for rapid
recombination and exchange. The corporation is not a thing. What
happens in the assembling, combination, and recombination of capital,
investors, and assets is a series of transactions loosely bound in a firm-
the nexus of these transactions-which are not themselves a thing.27
Perhaps, one may say, Foucault meets Coasean economics: the thing
(power, rules, and deal activity), whatever it is, "is produced from one
moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one
point to another., 28  The corporation is "vertiginously complex,
electronic, and hypothetical., 29 Its creation and re-creation are propelled
by ingenuity and energy supplied by capital and by those drawn to the
fluidity created by the velocity of capital. The corporation, in which
transactions produce a nexus of activities loosely bound by the idea of
the firm, differs from the nation-state, which largely assumes stable
identity and draws upon narratives to sustain its domain.
30
24. Campbell v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 238 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir.
2001).
25. Catd Backer, supra note 1, at 551.
26. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 32 (2003).
27. Id. at 30 ("The firm is a legal fiction representing the complex set of contractual
relationships between... inputs. In other words, the firm is not a thing, but rather a
nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among
the various inputs making up the firm.").
28. CatA Backer, supra note 1, at 541 (quoting FOUCAULT, SUpra note 1, at 93).
29. PATRICK BRANTLINGER, FICTIONS OF STATE: CULTURE AND CREDIT IN BRITAIN,
1694-1994 24 (Comell U. Press 1996).
30. Id. at 10 ("Nation-states produce a variety of more or less official narratives, or
forms of national representation, to create and sustain their legitimation."). It is argued,
though, that processes of privatization are reducing the state role in the affairs of its
citizens, and, thus, implicitly, may be stunting the narratives of nation-states. See Tony
Judt, The Wrecking Ball ofInnovation, 54 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 6, 2007.
The real impact of privatization, like welfare reform, deregulation, the
[Vol. 26:3
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Third, the strongest critique of the corporation in academic writing
has receded to a large degree, despite a continuing search by academics
for critical traction against the conception of the corporation as a set of
voluntary transactions.31 In this critique, a battle was fought on behalf of
"an autonomous reified complex of law" against the "enablingism', 32
brought to corporate codes beginning in the 1950's. The receding
"thing" that law might control frustrates the domain of law, but does not
become a site of law. Hence, the business court is about mastering the
rule of deference to economic exchange, giving minimal input of a legal
mandate to the velocity of the exchange. Law is present, but is modest in
it its relation to the basic impulse of economic exchange.
33
The reaction to the growing scope of corporate logic, and its
attendant lack of human level narrative and sense of context, parallels the
description Professor McCloskey gives to the serial conceptual attacks
on capitalism over the last century, in which a disposition to conclude
that capitalism is a bad system produces periodic, but always refuted and
ultimately discarded, new efforts at critique. 34 These efforts at critique
technological revolution, and indeed globalization itself, has been to reduce the
role of the state in the affairs of its citizens: to get the state "off our backs" and
"out of our lives"-a common objective of economic "reformers"
everywhere-and make public policy, in Robert Reich's approving words,
"business-friendly." Id.
3 1. For a strong statement of the corporation as a set of voluntary transactions, see,
e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 32 ("This contractarian account of this (wealth
maximization) norm rests not on an outmoded reification of the corporation, but on the
presumption of validity a free market society accords voluntary contracts.").
32. Professor Elvin Latty captured the concept of enablingism as "consisting of four
facets: freeing corporations from centuries-old fetters deriving from the theory that a
corporation was a sovereign concession, providing a useful blueprint for the paper to
create, operate, and end a corporation, committing the main initiative and powers to
management, and avoiding concern with reform." Mae Kuykendall, Reflections on a
Corporate Law Draftsman: Ernest L. Folk's Lessons for Writing and Judging Corporate
Law, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 391, 430 n.138 (2004) (citing Elvin R. Latty, Why are Business
Corporations Largely "Enabling"? 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599, 602 (1965)).
33. Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 6 (2007) (U. of Ill. College of
Law, Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE07-026), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/pape.tar?abstractid=1003790 (last visited Jan. 6, 2008)
(describing the "uncorporation" as a means of designing financial arrangements around
the corporate form and hence allowing the governance rules involving capital to recede
further from sight).
[E]quipped with uncorporation incentive and other governance devices, firms
can waive fiduciary duties, minimize the control powers allocated to the public
owners, or deny the power to trade control rights, thereby nullifying the market
for control. Thus, the uncorporation may be able to preserve the diversification
and information benefits of public markets while reducing some of the costs of
being publicly held.
Id.
34. Deirdre McCloskey, Creative Destruction, supra note 4, at 63.
Thus the major indictment of capitalism by the socialists of the 1850s was for
2008]
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can be seen as failed attempts to deploy narrative to undermine the sway
of capitalism, attempts that are frustrated by the void of story material in
capital. Critics of capitalism might be seen as failed narrators, who cast
about for material to inspire a negative response to the forms of
economic exchange in a free market. At best, their efforts confirm the
absence of material for their narrative, and name the features of
economic effort that disjoin business affairs from human level stories.
35
Such writings do not create a coherent narrative about the economics of
the corporate form from which a program of political action follows.
One might, with some fairness, describe corporate law as having a
characteristic of detachment that renders even critique abstract. Indeed,
the relationship of judges to the questions presented by corporate
disputes brings to mind the insights of an essay on the temperament of
Justice Holmes, in which the essence of the judge was captured in the
attitude of a spectator.36 Rogat argued that Justice Holmes's philosophy
and judicial decision-making could only be understood by a deep
appreciation of the extent of Holmes's detachment.37 The argument
about the source of Justice Holmes's intellectual detachment has to do
immiserating the working people. When this proved scientifically wrong, the
socialists of the 1890s indicted it for imperialism. When that too proved
wrong, at any rate by the lights of the best economic scientists who troubled to
look into the matter (among them Joseph Schumpeter), the socialists of the
1950s indicted it for alienation. When this accusation seemed less fresh, the
socialists of the 1990s indicted it for environmental decay. Schumpeter wrote
that "such refutation," rationally proving the latest indictment wrong, "may tear
the rational garb of attack [on capitalism and all its work] but can never reach
the extra-rational driving power that always lurks behind it." Schumpeter
stressed the robustness of capitalism in the economy, the vigor with which new
entrants dissolve the monopoly profits of the first mover, and the enormous
dividends it leaves for the poor. Robust, yes, but in a certain important respect
still fragile: "The emotional attachment to the social order," wrote this
conservative, in an almost Burkean way, was "the very thing capitalism is
constitutionally unable to produce." No one loves a Rockefeller. Everyone
loves a Virgin Queen.
Id.
35. See, e.g., RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER 30 (Norton & Co.
1998).
What is missing between the polar opposites of drifting experience and static
assertion is a narrative which could organize (a young corporate manager's)
conduct. Narratives are more than simple chronicles of events; they give shape
to the forward movement of time, suggesting reasons why things happen,
showing their consequences .... (The manager) lived in a world marked... by
short-term flexibility and flux; this world does not offer much, either
economically or socially, in the way of narrative. Corporations break up or join
together, jobs appear and disappear, as events lacking connections.
Id.
36. See Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 213 (1964).
37. Id. at 226.
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with the distancing from American society that a class of patricians at the
turn of the century assumed vis d vis both culture and power.38
Nonetheless,39 the portrait of detachment suggests an intellectual stance
that judges find themselves unable to avoid in the area of the financial
logic of the corporate form. Holmes's personal distaste for American
culture created a disinterest in politics, an insistence on the independence
of laws and morals; 40 the withdrawal "from important areas of shared
human experience;'' 4 the hiding of private identity behind a public mask;
and an interest, expressed most strongly by his contemporary Henry
Adams, in a mechanical, or pseudo-scientific, theory of history based
upon "the unyielding and inappropriate language of physics.,
42
In the Holmes treatment of law and morals, there is an idea that the
sovereign's views might be distorted if the judge "associated legal rules
with moral ideas. 43 In the relatively minimal role claimed by judges to
referee the formation and recombination of corporate enterprises, the
understanding that moral ideas may not be relevant to law gains greater
force as the relevance of law itself recedes in the minimalist involvement
of courts as "spectators" of corporate logic and the whirlwind of
corporate events. Judges act as spectators of the operations of internal
corporate logic within the parameters of abstract rules that permit a type
of corporate game to proceed. For the most part, they decline to
intervene in a broad range of disputes, either because of a view that there
is no corporate essence that a given manipulation of the corporate code
for a business goal violates, or because of detachment from the culture of
the public corporation.
For example, the Delaware courts decline to credit theories that the
design of the corporate code is violated if the corporate order is
manipulated to achieve the substantive result of a corporate merger while
bypassing the provisions of the merger code. 4 The Delaware courts, and
other American courts, try to be agnostic about the scale of pay
arrangements that make sense for a corporate officer in business culture
and that often deliver huge exit packages to executives.45  The
agnosticism in corporate legal disputes about the corporate form itself is
of an order beyond that which Holmes described for applying criminal
law. There is both a suspension of moral assessment and a bracing
38. Id. at 228-30.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 225.
41. Rogat, supra note 36, at 230.
42. Id. at 236.
43. Id. at 225.
44. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (rejecting the
concept of de facto mergers).
45. See Campbell, 238 F.3d 792.
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degree of skepticism about the scope or relevance of norms, drained even
of moral aspiration, that might be supplied by law to constrain the
operation of corporate logic or culture. The Delaware courts claim their
most definite role in laying down a legal rule when they protect what
they refer to as the "franchise of the shareholders," which creates an
opening for the courts to opine on an underlying legal premise of the
corporate form that requires the court as legal guardian46 and purports to
protect citizens when they are shareholders. This may be the one
departure from detachment the Delaware courts permit themselves, and it
provides the basis for a deep embrace of detachment regarding the
remaining domain of the corporate logician.
The character of the corporate form, and of business as a social
enterprise, lends itself, in the consideration of legal governance over the
relationships in business ventures, to a detached approach. Such an
approach minimizes the particular, replaces the underlying facts about
the human component of enterprises with public masks, and promulgates
quasi-scientific language that minimizes the study of business in the
language of popular culture, or of business, itself prone to
depersonalization.
The predominating nature of the construct leaves a narrative surplus
unneeded to resolve legal issues and un-deployed to provide readability
to the corporate language of finance and business. The narrative extra
material is largely unrecorded in legal materials, or is revealed in bits and
pieces, leaving outside readers floundering for the texture that anchors
their understanding of other legal materials. Indeed, much of the inner
spirit of corporate law resides in the minds and files, and now the
laptops, of corporate lawyers. Its outer shell appears soulless to some.
The courts, acting as spectators, do not infuse it with a meaning provided
by the content of law as an authoritative guide to our common values.
The position of the courts as spectators of the clashes over control
of public corporation puts their ability to maintain detachment to the test.
Agnosticism, or a studied indifference, is more difficult to achieve when
management comes to the table as a player47 and becomes differentiated
from the amorphous avatars of business judgment, who generally occupy
the judicial imagination. Confronted with the transformation of
corporate managers into bidders for corporate control and with serial
corporate raiders, the Delaware courts began to write fact-laden accounts
of takeover battles with characters given some flesh and blood. Robert
46. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
47. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1101 (1997) (characterizing Delaware cases as morality
tales for lawyers).
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Maxwell came close to personification in a key Delaware case on board
management of auctions for corporate control; actions and treatment of
"Maxwell" are recounted, but the name Maxwell refers to plaintiffs
collectively. 48 These accounts lack the use that dramatists would make
of a clearly drawn figure with a personality and typicality that makes the
course of the story instructive socially. In the strict standards for
narrative, as used by experts in literature, the fact-laden essays of the
Delaware courts do not merit classification as narrative. 49 The essays
lack recurring concrete characters, narrative conventions, and simplicity.
They seem more like open ruminations, or even diaries written by
someone who is reporting second-hand information, than narrative,
which implies a coherent and predictable structure with a narrator and a
reader who are bonded by a common understanding of the narrative
structure and rituals.5 °
A further feature of Delaware takeover law is that it is criticized as
having indeterminate legal rules. Such indeterminacy fuels litigation and
makes planning for certain types of corporate transactions unpredictable
and subject to the creation of new tests or the application of unclear
tests.51  A summary of the critique of Delaware law explains how
Delaware law partly fails in its mission of being a basis for corporate
transactions that are voluntary in nature and self-regulating, with the
premises supplied by a set of stipulated rules for a game that needs no
more than an occasional call by a referee:
Many of these decisions involved changes in Delaware's law, and
they occurred in areas involving review of important transactions,
48. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d 1261.
49. Without a doubt, the cases contain some narrative materials. For definitions of
"narrative," "narrativity," and related concepts, see GERALD PRINCE, DICTIONARY OF
NARRATOLOGY, REVISED EDITION, 56-57 (2003); Rock, supra note 47, at 1071-72
(describing the genre of memoranda to clients concerning takeover law developments, to
wit):
[R]eading these memos is very hard going. Although the discussions of legal
doctrine are extremely sophisticated, the memoranda are filled with enormous
factual detail about the cases. Compared to more academic discussions, the
case discussions seem only partly digested: one finds only summaries of the
factual background without the synthesis that makes such case-by-case
presentation unnecessary.
Id. at 1071-72.
50. Rock, supra note 47, at 1071-72. Rock suggests that the corporate client
constitutes a reader for the genre of memos to clients, and that this reader understands
that clarity is not possible if accuracy is to be preserved. See also PRINCE, supra note 49,
at 61 (defining narrative audience).
51. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's
Continuing Success 11-12 (2007) (Emory School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 07-17), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999477 (last
visited Jan. 6, 2008).
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such as mergers and acquisitions. The important observation here is
not that rules are difficult to discern once announced, but that new
rules have been announced with remarkable regularity. These rules
represent surprises for those who have recently completed
transactions that are now subject to challenge in an unexpected way,
and new risks of liability for participants.
5 2
One may well ask if this picture of Delaware law is consistent with
the argument that corporate transactions are a domain that eludes the
claims of law as jurisdictio or gubernaculum. The answer is that
Delaware court opinions are produced because the corporations they
affect have chosen Delaware law to be applied to their inter- and intra-
corporate transactions. Corporate counsel has the expectation that the
primary role of the courts will be that of a referee, whose only function is
to provide a service that permits the game to operate. The referee is not
asked to formulate a theory of the game or to seek substantive justice, but
merely to make calls that have to be made within the stipulated premises.
The fact that the referee makes errors on occasion does not alter the
fundamental conception of the referee's role as a facilitator and not a
law-giver. 3 Ask any sports fan.
Unlike the referee in sports, however, courts rendering corporate
opinions must explain themselves in writing. 4 The requirement that the
referee explain himself creates an odd genre. One possible explanation
of the form of takeover opinions may be that the courts struggle in them
to record social history and even to report an emerging change in the
personality of management, rather than providing any deep critique,
based on cultural norms, of the behavior of investment bankers,
managers bidding to buy their company, and lawyers. At the edges,
these opinions draw on the rules of the game to explain why a corporate
action is one of three possible types: formally disallowed as not effective
in the game premises that authorize further play,55 a violation that
constitutes a foul, 56 or acceptable. 57 The related commentary is not law,
52. Id. at 13.
53. The court often conceives of its modest role as an effort to skirt a "risk that the
normative preferences of the judiciary will replace those of the General Assembly."
Hollinger Inc., 858 A. 2d at 377. Further, the enablingism adopted by the legislature is a
first-order statement of a modest role for law-giving for internal corporate affairs.
54. Referees in sporting events are known to give simple oral explanations of their
calls, but the convention of court opinions requires the court to undertake an account of
its reasoning that challenges the scope of the function of referee and introduces a degree
of commentary that magnifies error.
55. Blasius, 564 A.2d 651 (disallowing a corporate board's use of bylaw provisions
to frustrate a stockholder vote).
56. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(holding that defensive maneuvers violated a corporate board's duties as auctioneer of the
company, in the circumstances).
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but instead the referee's explanation of his understanding of the game
and, often, of the referee's role. While corporations cannot escape
entirely from the use of state-authorized referees, they have considerable
choice among referee candidates. 58 Furthermore, the concession theory
59
of the corporation, which was used to justify strong intervention into the
logic of the corporation with judicial theories about a public purpose and
a corporate deal with shareholders that gave them a claim on the
corporate personality, was abandoned long ago. 60 Hence, corporations
are able to proceed with deals amongst themselves, propelled by the
force and logic of economic exchange, with minimal state refereeing by
state-based courts that do not impose legal norms per se.
While analyzed as indeterminate and productive of litigation,6' the
opinions of the Delaware courts can be seen as a form of minimalist
refereeing, with the necessity of displaying a degree of literacy about
corporate affairs and a charge to record aspects of corporate and
economic history. Indeed, the purpose of the display of business literacy
is to reassure corporate lawyers that judges will not misapprehend the
scope of their task as being the imposition of norms drawn from a
general political culture. The opinions produced by judicial business
"literates" are not a source of norms that are either derived from the
culture in general or brought from the bottom up. They are an ongoing
project to provide refereeing services, and in the bargain, by providing
their bona fides as judges for corporate law, to record the manners of the
corporate game.62 In a sense, the Delaware courts combine the functions
of a referee and sports writer,63 with episodic accounts that are not
57. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(upholding the validity, under Delaware law, of a company's selective self tender of its
shares).
58. For an argument that the market for corporate law resembles the market for other
types of law, in which the ability to shop to avoid mandatory regulatory schemes is not
unique to corporate governance and in which some mandatory law is unavoidable, see
Larry E. Ribstein & Erin A. O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, U. ILL. LAW
REv. (forthcoming 2008).
59. See Kuykendall, supra note 32.
60. William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407,433-36 (1989).
61. Carney & Shepherd, supra note 51, at 11-12.
62. The recent Cerberus-URI case provides a good example of the Delaware courts
as referees and as scribes used to record the manners of the corporation. See United
Rentals, Inc., v. Ram Holdings, Inc., No. 3360-CC (Del. Ch., filed Dec. 21, 2007),
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/files/uri-opinion 12 .21-07.pdf
(last visited Jan. 6, 2008) (providing a virtually instant decision with heavy description of
the deal and with use of a concept of the "forthright negotiator" as the basis of decision).
63. To the extent the analogy of Delaware judges to sports writers bears further
development, it may be of interest to Delaware judges to learn that sports writers have
joined athletes in the free agency market, commanding larger and larger salaries for their
services in media outlets such as ESPN. See Richard Perez-Pena, The Top Player in This
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necessarily consistent in the selection of details for emphasis or
definitive about the game chronicled. Corporate opinions about
takeovers resemble the form of novels, in which details are included that
do not serve to support the central moral theme of the writing.
64
In this regard, the thesis that American jurisprudence has tended to
take the stance of the observer is of interest. 65 If seen as a form of novel,
the takeover opinions are a repository of data about the manners of the
corporate culture, but not one that creates an authoritative set of
meanings about the task of refereeing a game. Courts handling corporate
takeover issues offer ruminations on the deep structural issue that has
dominated corporate law and theory: the legitimacy of management.
While critiquing the specific behavior of managers who vie to buy their
company or who resist takeovers despite the contrary preference of
shareholders, the courts are also transcribing features of social and
economic history. The result is to create a repository of writing that is
superior to any other writings on salient corporate events, in the process
of combination and recombination, but not necessarily to provide a
coherent legal or moral account. In truth, the fact-rich opinions are not
morality tales, 66 but they are fitful efforts to record corporate
transactions, provide refereeing services, and contribute the comments of
informed observers to the record. The result is an unsystematic but
interesting body of writing about corporate logic and, to a degree,
corporate mores. A key aspect of the corporate form that the courts
capture in their writings is the alteration of the posture of management
from faceless bureaucrats to individuals seeking new forms of power and
justifying their exercise of power by new social rituals.67 Indeed, in The
Age of Discontinuity, Peter Drucker describes the frustration of the
knowledge worker, who requires a renewal and growth that organizations
have difficulty providing.68 The courts also reinforce the awareness of
the formality of the rules by which corporations are created and altered.
They explain the rules in the relatively simple manner of a game's
League? It May Be the Sports Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2007. The market value of
legal opinions, compared with other compensated commentary, is an unexplored but
potentially rich subject in an era that commodifies intellectual property for large profits.
64. Interview with Robert Hass, Ann Arbor, Michigan (July 2001), regarding how
novels differ from apologues.
65. Id.
66. Rock, supra note 47.
67. PETER DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY: GUIDELINES TO OUR CHANGING
SOCIETY 188 (Transaction Books 1992). Peter Drucker has discussed the social
incomprehensibility of faceless power, exercised by mandarins. The emergence of
"princes" of the corporation, while recorded with an accompanying critique, may also be
an interesting social development, with implications that the courts strive in their writings
to understand, announce, and rationalize. Id.
68. Id. at 287-90.
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moderator checking the rule book and reminding the players of the
game's premises.
It is unclear what the courts' effort to record social events of some
import in the corporate world produces as a cultural artifact. As those
who struggle to interpret corporate contest cases discover, the law
produced is not clear. The effort to classify the material as a type of
narrative, to extract from it a legal holding capable of summation and
generalization, may produce analysis that strives to fit cases into a
narrative classification.69 Such classification may be chosen to support
legal conclusions about the cases. What one sees in judicial opinions
may be best understood, however, as a set of writings by judges who are
detached from the business culture and who use the opinions to chronicle
business developments and to provide minimalist restatements of the
ground rules by which courts maintain their detachment.
The result is a domain of human activity that lies within sight, that
is intensely imbedded in words,70 and which is fashioned with a
recondite vocabulary of law as a lingua franca, but not as a medium in
which to fashion a normative regime derived from meanings generally
accessible in the culture. There are sightings from the Ship of State of
the vessel in which the returns of capital are gathered, but the
understandings that guide the Ship of State are not those that chart the
course for those sailing with a compass made of silver.
69. Rock, supra note 47, at 1016 (suggesting that Delaware courts produce corporate
parables for moral instruction).
70. McCloskey, supra note 34.
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